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ZHANG, J., WANG, S. – ZU, L. Stability of international environmental agreements in the leadership model. J Syst Sci Complex 21, 184-190 (2008). doi.org/10.1007/s11424-008-9102-1. . 1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. W.Montreal, Quebec H3G 1MBCanada C. D`Aspremont, A. Jacquemin, J. J.
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A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers, Series AD with number 2001-21. Journal of Systems Science and Complexity Volume 21, Pages184-190 (2008)Cite this article W. D. Nordhaus and Z. Yang, A regional dynamic general-equilibrium model of alternative climate-change strategies, American Economic Review, 1996, 86(4): 741-765. Department of Economics, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, H3A 2T7, Canada . This is an overview of the content of the subscription, log in to check access.
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